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Jacoby, L.L., Hessels, S., & Bopp, K. (2001). Proactive and
retroactive effects in memory performance: Dissociating recollection and
accessibility bias. In H. L. Roediger, III, J. S. Nairne, I. Neath, &
A. M. Surprenant (Eds.), The nature of Remembering: Essays
in honor of Robert G. Crowder (pp. 35-54). Washington, DC: American
Psychological Association.
Provides a new perspective on retroactive interference in
memory. The authors dissociate two forms of memory, recollection and
accessibility bias, and show how their ideas can account for both classic
and new findings in this area. They forward a dual-process account of
retroactive and proactive interference that differs from the traditional
account that appeals to unlearning and response competition. The authors'
approach seeks to measure the contributions of recollection and automatic
influences of memory. Recollection is assumed to be independent of more
automatic forms of memory that are largely preserved in people with
amnesia and older adults and are, to some extent, revealed by performance
on indirect tests. The authors argue that in contrast to alternative
approaches, the greater susceptibility to interference shown by the older
adults is a consequence rather than a cause of age-related differences in
memory. Using experiments analyzing the misinformation effect on memory,
they show that retroactive and proactive interference sometimes results
from an effect on automatic influence of memory that they term
"accessibility bias" without changing ability to recollect.
Jones, T. C., Jacoby, L. L., & Gellis, L. A. (2001).
Cross-modal feature and conjunction errors in recognition memory. Journal of Memory and Language, 44(1), 131-152.
Four experiments (n = 192) were conducted to investigate whether
a modality-specific familiarity contributes to feature and conjunction
errors and, hence, to recognition memory. In each experiment the
presentation modality of compound words was manipulated at study
(auditory or visual), and in Exp 2 the presentation modality for the test
also was manipulated. In Exp 3, participants were pushed to respond
quickly in order to create a reliance on familiarity rather than
recollection. In Exp 4, a direct manipulation of response deadline was
employed. Across experiments, auditory and visual tests did not produce
different hit rates or feature and conjunction error rates, and shifts in
study-to-test modality did not affect hit rates or feature and
conjunction error rates. The response deadline manipulation of Exp 4
affected old/new discrimination but not feature and conjunction effects
(feature/new and conjunction/new discrimination), producing a
dissociation. Unlike implicit perceptual memory, modality information
does not appear to contribute to the familiarity underlying feature and conjunction
errors. The familiarity underlying feature and conjunction errors, and
thus in recognition memory, is different from the familiarity underlying
perceptual implicit memory.
Kelley, C.M. & Jacoby, L.L. (2000). Recollection
and familiarity: Process-dissociation. In E. Tulving & F.I.M. Craik
(Eds.), The Oxford handbook of memory. New York, NY: Oxford
University Press.
This chapter focuses on whether the different subjective experiences
of familiarity and recollection indicate the need for 2 distinct
processes in models of memory, or whether they simply reflect a
quantitative difference in a single dimension or single process such as
"trace strength." If recollection and familiarity are separate
memory processes, what is the nature of those processes, and what is the
relationship between the processes in the performance of a task such as a
recognition memory test?
Hay, J.F., & Jacoby, L.L. (1999). Separating habit and
recollection in young and elderly adults. Effects of
elaborative processing and distinctiveness. Psychology and Aging, 14,
122-134.
An extension of L. L. Jacoby's (1991) process-dissociation
procedure was used to examine the effects of aging on recollection and automatic
influences of memory (habit). Experiment 1 showed that older adults were
impaired in their ability to engage in recollection but did not differ
from young adults in their reliance on habit. Elderly adults were also
less able to exploit distinctive contextual information to enhance
recollection. Experiments 2 and 3 showed that with more supportive
conditions, older adults were able to benefit from distinctive contextual
information. Quantitative and qualitative deficits in recollective
abilities are interpreted within a dual-process model of memory. The
problem of distinguishing between a deficit in recollection and a deficit
in inhibitory processes in older adults (e. g., L. Hasher & R. T.
Zacks, 1998) and the importance of this distinction for purposes of
repairing memory performance are discussed.
Jacoby, L.L. (1999). Deceiving the Elderly: Effects of
accessibility bias in cued-recall performance. Cognitive
Neuropsychology, 16, 417-436.
Two experiments examined age-related differences in a misinformation
paradigm. 72 young (undergraduates) and 24 elderly (aged 64-89 yrs)
participants studied a list of related word pairs (e.g., bed sheet) aand
were then given a cued-recall test ("bed s_ee' presented as cues for
recall of "sheet"). A "prime" stimulus was presented
briefly before each test trial. On congruent trials the prime was the
target word from study ("sheet") whereas on incongruent trials
the prime was a related word that was a plausible response but not the
target ("sleep"). On baseline trials, the prime was a string of
ampersands. When forced to respond (Exp 1), both young and elderly Ss
demonstrated a bias to respond with the prime word, although the elderly
Ss showed a larger false memory effect as measured by higher false
recalls on incongruent relative to baseline trials. When given the option
to pass (Exp 2), elderly Ss continued to exhibit a large bias toward the
prime word whereas young Ss tended to pass when they were unable to
recall the target. Results are interpreted in terms of an accessibility
bias, which influences guessing and is a basis of responding independent
of recollection.
Jacoby, L.L. (1999). Ironic effects of repetition: Measuring
age-related differences in memory. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 25,
3-22.
Four experiments examined ironic effects of repetition, effects
opposite to those desired (cf, D. M. Wegner, 1994). For an exclusion
task, participants were to respond "yes" to words heard earlier
but 'no' to words that were read earlier. Results from young adults given
adequate time to respond showed that false alarms to earlier-read words
decreased with their repetition. An opposite, ironic effect of repetition
was found for elderly adults--false alarms to earlier-read words increased
with repetition. Younger adults forced to respond quickly or to perform a
secondary task while reading words showed the same ironic effect of
repetition as did elderly adults. The process-dissociation procedure (L.
L. Jacoby, 1991, 1998) was used to show that factors that produce ironic
effects do so by reducing recollection while leaving effetion while
leaving effetion while leaving effects of repetition on familiarity
unchanged.
Jacoby, L.L., Kelley, C.M., & McElree, B.D. (1999). The role
of cognitive control: Early selection vs late
correction. In S. Chaiken & Y. Trope (Eds.),Dual-process theories
in social psychology, (pp.383-400). NY: Guilford.
This chapter begins by examining the automatic bases of
emotional response and their relation to memory deficits and errors in
monitoring. The authors, whose overall goal is to measure and train
intentional uses of memory, propose an early-selection model of conscious
control as an alternative to a late-correction model of conscious
control. In the early-selection model, conscious memory retrieval starts
very early in processing, although it may take longer to complete than an
automatic process. The authors contend that cognitive control more often
serves an early-selection role rather than serving to correct automatic
processes. They describe an experiment done to examine effects of a
"stereotype" on perception, which illustrates the difference
between early-selection and late-correction forms of cognitive control.
Jacoby, L.L., McElree, B., & Trainham, T.N. (1999). Automatic influences as accessibility bias in memory and
Stroop-like tasks: Toward a formal model. In A. Koriat & D. Gopher
(Eds.), Attention and Performance XVII, (pp.461-486). Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Automatic processes can operate to increase the accessibility of
a particular response. A series of experiments using the process
dissociation procedure is reported to show that the effects of such
accessibility bias are independent of those of more algorithmic
(consciously controlled) based for responding. For example, habit
originating from training in the experimental setting can produce an
accessibility bias whose effects are independent of recollection. Habit
serves to increase the probability of a particular response regardless of
whether it opposed or acts in concert with the effects of recollection,
the indented basis for responding. The process dissociation procedure
combines results from opposition (interference) and in-concert
(facilitation) conditions to separate the contribution of automatic and
consciously controlled processes. use of the procedure is based on the
assumption that automatic and controlled processes are independent based
for responding. This independence assumption can be instantiated in a
model similar to a recent counter model advanced in 1997 to provide an
account of process distribution dissociation that is more detailed, but
consistent with, the authors original model.
McElree, B., Dolan, P.O., & Jacoby, L.L. (1999). Isolating
the contributions of familiarity and source information to
item recognition: A time course analysis. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 25, 563-582.
Recognition memory may be mediated by the retrieval of distinct
types of information, notably, a general assessment of familiarity and
the recovery of specific source information. A response-signal
speed-accuracy trade-off variant of an exclusion procedure was used to
isolate the retrieval time course for familiarity and source information.
In 2 experiments, participants studied spoken and read lists (with
various numbers of presentations) and then performed an exclusion task,
judging an item as old only if it was in the heard list. Dual-process
fits of the time course data indicated that familiarity information
typically is retrieved before source information. The implications that
these data have for models of recognition, including dual-process and
global memory models, are discussed.
Jacoby, L.L. (1998). Invariance in automatic influences of
memory: Toward a user's guide for the process-dissociation procedure. Journal
of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition., 24,
3-26.
Three experiments investigated assumptions of the
process-dissociation procedure for separating consciously controlled and
automatic influences of memory. Conditions that encouraged direct
retrieval revealed process dissociations. Manipulating attention during
study or manipulating study time affected recollection but left automatic
influences of memory relatively invariant. However, paradoxical
dissociations were found when conditions encouraged use of a
generate-recognize strategy, violating assumptions underlying the
estimation procedure. Use of subjective reports to gain estimates
produced parallel results. Easily observed correlations are shown to be
not useful for testing assumptions underlying the process-dissocation
procedure. A multinomial model produced results that agree with those
from the process-dissociation approach.
Hay, J.F., Nordlie, J.W., & Jacoby, L.L. (1998). Assessing
memory deficits in elderly adults: Repetition errors,
misattributions, and memory slips. In M. J. Intons-Peterson & D. L.
Best (Eds.), Challenges and controversies in applied cognition: Memory
distortions and their prevention (pp.49-62). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Investigates misleading effects of memory that can arise when
automatic influences are unopposed by recollection. Standard memory tests
fail to separate out contributions to performance of these 2 bases of
responding that can lead to an overestimation of memory abilities in
older adults. The authors describe an opposition procedure used to assess
recollection deficits in elderly adults and discuss the advantages of
such a procedure as a diagnostic tool. Finally, some preliminary results
from a training procedure designed to rehabilitate recollection are
presented.
Jacoby, L.L., Jones, T.C., & Dolan, P.O. (1998). Two effects
of repetition: Support for a dual-process model of Know
judgments and exclusion errors. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review,
5, 705-709.
In 3 experiments, a remember/know recognition test (Exps 1 and
2) and an exclusion test (Exps 2 and 3) were used to examine effects of
repeated study presentations. An effect of study repetition was obtained
for remember but not know judgments, similar to results reported by J.
Gardiner, et al (see record 1996-06483-010). Exp 2 demonstrated the
similarity between know responses and exclusion errors; neither was
affected by repeated study presentations. In Exp 3, a response deadline
procedure was used to show that exclusion errors are the product of two
opposing processes, recollection and familiarity, both of which are
influenced by repetition. The interpretation of exclusion errors and know
responses is shown to require a dual-process model that includes an
assumption about the relationship between processes.
Kelley, C.M., & Jacoby, L.L. (1998). Subjective reports and
process dissociation: Fluency, knowing, and feeling. Acta
Psychologica, 98, 127-140.
Reviews research on the fluency heuristic as a basis for the
subjective experience of familiarity. The links between the construct of
fluency and the automatic vs consciously controlled memory processes that
are estimated using the process dissociation procedure, and the
phenomenological experiences studied using "Remember" and
"Know" judgements are explored. Although the fluency that
underlies familiarity may map onto the automatic memory process that is
estimated by the process dissociation procedure, both fluency and
automatic memory processes arise in a particular context and their
expression depends on the joint constraints created by the cues and the
task.
Jacoby, L.L., Begg, I.M., & Toth, J.P. (1997). In defense of
functional independence: Violations of assumptions underlying the
process-dissociation procedure? Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory and Cognition. 23, 484-495.
T. Curran and D. L. Hintzman (1995) claim to have shown that the
independence assumption underlying the process-dissociation procedure (L.
L. Jacoby, 1991) is not justified. They argued that the correlations
between processes at the level of items can result in an underestimation
of automatic processes large enough to produce artifactual dissociations
between process estimates. In contrast, the authors show that the effects
of extremely high correlations at the level of items are likely to be
trivial, and not differential across conditions. Curran and Hintzman's
dissociations probably reflect violations of boundary conditions for use
of the process-dissociation procedure, rather than violations of
independence.
Jacoby, L.L., & Shrout, P.E. (1997). Toward a psychometric
analysis of violations of the independence assumption in process
dissociation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory,
and Cognition, 23, 505-510.
The authors outline a psychometric analysis of effects of
violating the independence assumption underlying the process-dissociation
procedure. That analysis distinguishes between process dependence
and aggregation bias. Process dependence results when subjects
rely on a strategy that makes recollection dependent on automatic
influences of memory and is reflected by a correlation that can only be
imagined, not observed. Aggregation bias results when parameters from a
subject-item specific psychometric model are estimated by aggregating
across observed subject and item data. Quantifying the magnitude of
aggregation bias also requires speculation about a correlation that is
not directly observed. Easily observed correlations calculated from
aggregated estimates of automatic and recollective processes over
subjects or items cannot be used to diagnose process dependence and are
of limited utility for diagnosing aggregation bias. A postscript responds
to T. Curran and D. L. Hintzman's (1997) reply.
Trainham, T., Lindsay, S., & Jacoby, L.L. (1997). Stroop
process dissociations: Reply to Hillstrom and Logan (1997). Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 23,
1579-1587.
The Stroop counter model, which shares the assumptions of the
application of process dissociation to the Stroop task presented by D. S.
Lindsay and L. L. Jacoby (1994), is described in order to demonstrate the
viability of these assumptions in quantitative models of the Stroop
phenomenon. An experiment is presented to show converging evidence from
applications of the process-dissociation procedure and the Stroop counter
model. A demonstration of the Stroop counter model's ability to simulate
both accuracy and response latency in the Stroop task is provided in the
context of this experiment. Descriptions of the processing architecture
in both the process-dissociation procedure and the Stroop counter model
are provided, and issues of independence are discussed.
Jacoby, L.L., Yonelinas, A.P. & Jennings, J. (1997). The
relation between conscious and unconscious (automatic) influences. A
declaration of independence. In J. Cohen & J.W. Schooler (Eds.), Scientific
approaches to consciousness (pp.13-47). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Provides an overview of research done within our
process-dissociation framework . . . for separating conscious and
unconscious influences / our strategy has been to gain estimates of the
contributions of each type of process to performance on a single task and
show dissociative effects of variables on those estimates / [assume] that
conscious and unconscious influences are independent of one another ///
highlight the purpose of the process-dissociation procedure and then
describe an experiment using that procedure to examine age-related
differences in cognitive control / consider potential assumptions for the
relation between unconscious and conscious processes, specifically,
independence, redundancy, and exclusivity / summarize evidence to support
the choice of the independence assumption and, finally, provide strong
evidence against the alternatives / treat the contrast between
unconscious vs consciously controlled processes as identical to the
contrast between automatic vs controlled processes.
Jennings, J.M., & Jacoby, L.L. (1997). An opposition
procedure for detecting age-related deficits in recollection: Telling
effects of repetition. Psychology and Aging, 12, 352-361.
In 2 experiments, the advantages of placing automatic and
consciously controlled memory processes in opposition to study
age-related declines in memory performance were examined. Drawing on the
common memory failure of mistakenly repeating oneself, a task was
designed in which participants had to rely on conscious memory
(recollection) to avoid repetition errors. Recollection proved to be
severely affected by aging; older adults showed significantly more
repetition errors than did younger adults, even at very short retention
intervals. These results contrast sharply with the small age differences
found with a standard recognition test. Moreover, L. L. Jacoby's (1991)
process-dissociation procedure (Experiment 2) showed that automatic
memory processes were unaffected with age and could support recognition
performance in older adults. The advantages of the opposition procedure
for studying memory in older adults relative to other measures are
discussed.
Hay, J.F., & Jacoby, L.L. (1996). Separating habit and
recollection: Memory slips, process dissociations and probability
matching. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and
Cognition, 22, 1323-1335.
Memory slips are errors in performance that result when an
automatic basis for responding (e.g. habit) opposes the intention to
perform a specific behavior. Prior research has focused on factors that
influence the probability of a memory slip while neglecting factors that
facilitate performance. Using L. L. Jacoby's (1991) process-dissociation
procedure to examine performance in both a memory-slip and a facilitation
condition, the authors separated the contribution of habit and
recollection (intentional memory) in a cued-recall task. The authors
found that manipulating the strength of habit affected its contribution
to performance in a manner that produced probability matching, but recollection
was unchanged. In contrast, manipulations of presentation rate and
response time influenced recollection but did not affect habit. Such
dissociations support a model of memory in which automatic and
intentional influences make independent contributions to performance.
Jacoby, L.L. (1996). Dissociating automatic and
consciously-controlled effects of study/test compatability. Journal of
Memory and Language, 35, 32-52.
Two experiments examined the effects of reinstated context on
consciously controlled and automatic influences of memory. Results showed
that reinstating associative context had separate effects of enhancing
both controlled and automatic influences. In contrast, dividing attention
during study reduced later recollection, a consciously controlled use of
memory, but left automatic influences unchanged (Experiment 1). Changing
modality between study and test eliminated data-driven, automatic
influences of memory but left conceptually driven influences invariant
(Experiment 2). The importance of separating consciously controlled and
automatic effects of study/test compatibility is discussed.
Kelley, C.M. & Jacoby, L.L. (1996). Adult egocentrism:
Subjective experience versus analytic bases for judgment. Journal of
Memory and Language, 35,157-175.
The influence of memory on the subjective experience of later
problem solving was investigated in two experiments. Study of the
solution words to anagrams in the first phase of the experiments lead to
faster solution of those anagrams in a second phase. Participants
interpreted their easy solution of old anagrams as due to characteristics
of the anagrams and judged them as easier for others to solve, relative
to new anagrams. When participants were deprived of the subjective
experience of solving the anagrams by presenting the solution with the
anagram, they switched to an alternative basis for judgment such as a
theory or rules, which lead to different ordering of items according to
judged difficulty (Experiment 1). Requiring participants to recognize
whether solution words had been presented in the first phase did not
eliminate the effect of prior presentation on judged difficulty, but
requiring recognition judgments and warning participants of the nature of
the effect did eliminate it (Experiment 2). We discuss the usefulness of
the distinction between judgments based on subjective experience versus
theory, introduce ways to diagnose when different bases for judgments are
used, and discuss how memory spoils subjective experience as a basis for
judgment.
Yonelinas, A.P., & Jacoby, L.L. (1996). Noncriterial
recollection: Familiarity as automatic, irrelevant recollection. Consciousness
and Cognition, 5,131-141.
Recollection is sometimes automatic in that details of a prior encounter
with an item come to mind although those details are irrelevant to a
current task. For example, when asked about the size of the type in which
an item was earlier presented, one might automatically recollect the
location in which it was presented. We used the process dissociation
procedure to show that such noncriterial recollection can function as
familiarity--its effects were independent of intended recollection.
Craik, F.I.M., & Jacoby, L.L. (1996). Aging and memory:
Implications for skilled performance. In W.A. Rogers, A.D. Fisk, & N.
Walker (Eds.), Aging and skilled performance: Advances in theory and
applications (pp.113-137). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Concerns age-related changes in human memory and the implications
that these changes have for the acquisition and maintenance of various
types of skilled performance [in the elderly] / after surveying what is
currently known and understood about the differences in memory abilities
at various ages, we focus primarily on the contrast between consciously
controlled and automatic processes /// argue that to understand memory
and learning fully, it is necessary to separate the contributions of
automatic and controlled processes / this may be especially true for age-related
differences, in which case there is reason to believe that consciously
controlled processing becomes less effective with increasing age,
necessitating a greater dependence on habitual modes of responding /
outline a method--[the process dissociation procedure]--that was
developed for the purposes of decomposing task performance into automatic
and controlled components and showing how the method can be applied to
problems of aging.
Jacoby, L.L., Jennings, J.M., & Hay, J.F. (1996).
Dissociating automatic and consciously controlled processes: Implications
for diagnosis and rehabilitation of memory deficits. In D.J. Herrmann,
C.L. McEvoy, C. Hertzog, P. Hertel, & M.K. Johnson (Eds.), Basic
and applied memory research: Theory in context (Vol.1, pp. 161-193).
Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Examined the effects of reinstated context on consciously
controlled and automatic influences of memory with 146 undergraduates.
Results showed that reinstating associative context had separate effects
of enhancing both controlled and automatic influences. Dividing attention
during study reduced later recollection, a consciously controlled use of
memory, but left automatic influences unchanged. Changing modality
between study and test eliminated data-driven, automatic influences of
memory but left conceptually driven influences invariant. The importance
of separating consciously controlled and automatic effects of study/test
compatibility is discussed.
McElree, B., Jacoby, L.L., & Dolan, P. (1996, November). Isolating
familiarity and recollective retrieval processes: A time-course analysis.
Presentation at the 37th Annual Meeting of the Psychonomic Society,
Chicago, IL.
Recognition memory may be mediated by the retrieval of distinct
types of information, notably, a general assessment of familiarity and
the recovery of specific source information. A response-signal
speed-accuracy trade-off variant of an exclusion procedure was used to
isolate the retrieval time course for familiarity and source information.
In 2 experiments, participants studied spoken and read lists (with
various numbers of presentations) and then performed an exclusion task,
judging an item as old only if it was in the heard list. Dual-process
fits of the time course data indicated that familiarity information typically
is retrieved before source information. The implications that these data
have for models of recognition, including dual-process and global memory
models, are discussed.
Yonelinas, A.P., & Jacoby, L.L. (1996). Response bias and
the process dissociation procedure. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General, 125(4), 422-439.
Two different approaches for treating response bias in the
process-dissociation procedure were assessed: a multinomial approach
proposed by A. Buchner et al (see record 82-31816) and a dual-process,
signal-detection approach proposed by A. P. Yonelinas et al (see record
83-29360). The authors examined data presented by Buchner et al and found
that, although the signal-detection-based model worked slightly better
than the multinomial model, the data did not provide a strong test of
either model. However, an examination of other recognition data showed
that the multinomial model produced distorted estimates of recollection
and familiarity, and it was unable to account for observed receiver
operating characteristics (ROCs). In contrast, the dual-process, signal
detection model produced unbiased estimates and was able to account for
the observed ROCs. The authors also provide an overview of the general
controversy surrounding the process-dissociation approach.
Toth, J.P., Reingold, E.M., & Jacoby, L.L. (1995). A
response to Graf and Komatsu's (1994) critique of the
process-dissociation procedure: When is caution necessary? European
Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 7, 113-130.
In a recent paper, Graf and Komatsu (1994) argued that the
process dissociation procedure (Jacoby, 1991) is limited in its ability
to separate and measure conscious and unconscious forms of memory and so
should be "handled with caution". Given that the study of
unconscious influences has always posed a difficult problem for memory
researchers, we agree with the general emphasis on caution. In this
paper, we too advocate caution, especially as it applies to indirect
tests, assessing Graf and Komatsu's critique, and using the process
dissociation procedure. We address the substantive issues raised by Graf
and Komatsu and also point out the errors, both factual and logical, in
their paper. Any method proposing to provide separate measures of
conscious and unconscious influences requires judicious use and a careful
examination of its underlying assumptions. The assumptions underlying the
process dissociation framework are supported by a large number of
experiments spanning a diverse range of conditions. In contrast, the assumptions
underlying implicit/explicit test comparisons, when articulated, are
found to be flawed and no solutions seem forthcoming. The process
dissociation procedure offers researchers the most promising approach for
disentangling conscious and unconscious influences.
Yonelinas, A.P., & Jacoby, L.L. (1995). Dissociating
automatic and controlled processes in a memory-search task: Beyond
implicit memory. Psychological Research,57, 156-165.
Our goal in this paper was to examine the processes that give
rise to action slips. Procedures used to examine implicit memory and
automatic processes were found to be unsatisfactory. However, the
process-dissociation procedure proved to be useful for examining the
contribution of the automatic and controlled processes underlying
performance. The procedure was used in conjunction with a Sternberg
memory-search task to examine the effects of set size, response speed,
and stimulus-response mapping on controlled and automatic processes. The
formulation allowed us to predict accurately how subjects would perform
in a varied mapping condition. Moreover, set size and response speed were
found to influence the controlled search processes, but to leave the
automatic influences unaffected. Stimulus-response mapping, on the other
hand, was found to lead to probability matching in the automatic
processes; this pattern was found to remain constant across changes in
set size and response speed.
Yonelinas, A.P., & Jacoby, L.L. (1995). The relation between
remembering and knowing as bases for recognition: Effects of size
congruency. Journal of Memory and Language,34, 622-643.
In three recognition memory experiments, subjects studied a list
of randomly generated geometric shapes, followed by a recognition test in
which old items were either size congruent (same size at study and test)
or size incongruent. In Experiment 1, the process dissociation procedure
(Jacoby, 1991) showed that changing the size of the items led to a
decrease in both recollection and familiarity. In Experiment 2, the remember/know
procedure (Tulving, 1985) showed that recollection, as indexed by the
proportion of "remember" responses, decreased with size
incongruence, but familiarity, as indexed by the proportion of
"know" responses, increased. The latter effect along with other
problems with the remember/know procedure were found to arise because of
the procedure's underlying assumption that recollection and familiarity
are mutually exclusive. When an independence assumption was combined with
the remember/know data (IRK), results agreed with those of the process
dissociation procedure. In Experiment 3. receiver operating
characteristics (ROCs) were examined using the remember/know procedure
and showed that familiarity was well described by a signal detection
process that was independent of recollection.
Yonelinas, A.P., Regehr, G., & Jacoby, L.L. (1995).
Incorporating response bias in a dual-process theory of memory. Journal
of Memory and Language, 34,821-835.
We examined several different methods of incorporating response bias
into a dual-process theory of recognition memory. Two high threshold
correction methods, which have previously been applied to the process
dissociation procedure, and a new, dual-process signal-detection method,
were assessed. An examination of receiver operating characteristics
(ROCs) showed that the threshold methods were inappropriate, but that the
signal-detection method provided a reasonable account of the observed
ROCs. Applying the corrections to a second data set showed that the
different correction methods led to dramatically different conclusions,
demonstrating that selecting the correct correction method is critical.
Moreover, in agreement with the ROC analysis, the signal-detection method
was the only one to provide a reasonable account of the data.
Jacoby, L.L. (1994). Measuring recollection: Strategic vs
automatic influences of associative context. In C. Umilta & M.
Moscovitch (Eds.), Attention and Performance XV (pp.661-679).
Cambridge, MA: Bradford.
There has been much recent interest in the finding of
dissociations between performance on indirect and direct tests of memory.
Indirect tests (e.g., word-stem completion) are said to primarily reflect
strategic or consciously controlled uses of memory. Rather than
identifying processes with tasks, as is done by use of the contrast
between indirect and direct tests, I (e.g., Jacoby, 1991) have used a
"process-dissociation procedure" to separate the within-task
contributions of consciously controlled and automatic uses of memory. I
describe advantages of the process-dissociation procedure over standard
direct tests as a means of measuring recollection. Because of its failure
to distinguish between automatic and strategic uses of memory, reliance
on standard, direct tests is shown to produce serious errors in
conclusions that are drawn. I propose a distinction between strategic and
automatic influences of associative context, and report two new
experiments to show the utility of that distinction. As will be discussed,
the strategic/automatic distinction is important for answering questions
about the effectiveness of providing environmental support to aid the
performance of memory-impaired individuals.
Jacoby, L.L., Toth, J.P., Yonelinas, A.P., & Debner, J.A. (1994).
The relationship between conscious and unconscious influences:
Independence or redundancy? Journal of Experimental Psychology:
General, 123, 216-219.
Determining the relationship between conscious and unconscious
influences is essential for obtaining valid estimates of the 2 types of
influence. S. Joordens and P. M. Merikle (1993) recently argued that a
redundancy relationship provides a plausible alternative to the
independence model proposed by L. L. Jacoby, J.P. Toth, and A. P.
Yonelinas (1993). In this article, the authors address Joordens and
Merikle's concerns and still find the independence model preferable:
First, the redundancy model requires the questionable assumption that a
direct test (inclusion) is process pure. Second, results obtained with
the independence model, but not with the redundancy model, converge with
the results from indirect tests. Finally, conclusions drawn from the
independence model are in accurdance with the theorizing that surrounds
the concept of automaticity.
Lindsay, D.S., & Jacoby, L.L. (1994). Stroop process
dissociations: The relationship between facilitationand interference. Journal
of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception & Performance, 20(2),
219-234.
L. L. Jacoby's (1991) "process dissociation procedure"
was used to quantitatively estimate the contributions of color-naming and
word-reading processes to responding on the Stroop task. The results show
that color naming and word reading can operate independently to determine
responses. Degrading stimulus colors eliminated the typical asymmetry
between Stroop facilitation and interference, as predicted by the
equations (Experiments 1 and 2). Degrading stimulus colors reduced the
estimated contribution of color naming to responding but had no effect on
the estimated contribution of word reading (Experiment 2). In contrast,
increasing the proportion of incongruent items reduced the estimated
contribution of word reading but had no effect on the estimated
contribution of color naming (Experiments 3 and 4). The results indicate
that the facilitating and interfering effects of automatic processes
cannot be accurately measured in terms of differences from baseline.
Debner, J.A., & Jacoby, L.L. (1994). Unconscious perception:
Attention, awareness, and control. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory & Cognition, 20(2), 304-317.
Conscious perception is substantially overestimated when
standard measurement techniques are used. That overestimation has
contributed to the controversial nature of studies of unconscious
perception. A process-dissociation procedure (L. L. Jacoby; see PA, Vol
79:7943) was used for separately estimating the contribution of conscious
and unconscious perception to performance of a stem-completion task.
Unambiguous evidence for unconscious perception was obtained in 4
experiments. In Exp 1, decreasing the duration of a briefly presented
word diminished the contribution of both conscious and unconscious
perception. In Exps 2-4, dividing attention reduced the contribution of
conscious perception while leaving that of unconscious perception
unchanged. Discussion focuses on the measurement of awareness and the
relation between perception and memory.
Toth, J.P, Reingold, E.M., & Jacoby, L.L. (1994). Towards a
redefinition of implicit memory: Process dissociations following
elaborative processing and self-generation. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 20, 290-303.
Does conceptual processing affect unconscious uses of memory?
The authors used a process-dissociation procedure to separate automatic
(unconscious) and consciously controlled uses of memory in a
stem-completion task. Contrary to results from indirect test conditions,
estimates derived from the procedure showed no effect of self-generation
and no differential effect of semantic and nonsemantic study conditions
on automatic uses of memory. These results provide evidence that (1)
indirect tests are often contaminated by conscious uses of memory and (2)
stem completion is highly dependent on prior perceptual (and perhaps
lexical) processing. The experiments demonstrate the advantages of using
process-dissociation procedures over comparisons between direct and
indirect tests.
Yonelinas, A.P., & Jacoby, L.L. (1994). Dissociations of
processes in recognition memory: Effects of interference and of response
speed. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 48:4,
516-534.
Examined effects on 2 bases for recognition-memory judgments
using a process dissociation procedure and variation in the length of
study lists in 3 experiments with 62 undergraduates. Exp 1 defined
recollection (RCL) and examined the influence of list length on RCL and
familiarity. Exp 2 redefined RCL, and Exp 3 examined differences in the
speed of the 2 bases for recognition using a response-signal procedure.
It was found that increasing the length of a study list interfered with
conscious RCL, but left familiarity in place. An examination of reaction
time (RT) distributions, as well as results from a response-signal
procedure, showed that familiarity was faster as a basis for recognition
judgments than was conscious RCL. Findings indicate that both bases
contributed to performance on the fastest as well as the slowest
responses, suggesting that the 2 processes were acting in parallel.
Jennings, J.M., & Jacoby, L.L. (1993). Automatic versus
intentional uses of memory: Aging, attention, and control. Psychology
& Aging, 8, 283-293.
In 2 experiments, the authors used a process dissociation
procedure (Jacoby, 1991) to separately examine the effects of aging on
automatic and consciously controlled memory processes. In Experiment 1, a
group of young adults in either a full-attention or divided-attention
condition were compared with a group of elderly adults on a fame judgment
task. Both age and divided attention had a detrimental effect on
consciously controlled memory processing but left automatic processing
intact. In Experiment 2, the same age-related pattern was found using a
more demanding forced-choice recognition paradigm.
Cermak, L.S., Verfaellie, M., Butler, T., & Jacoby, L.L.
(1993). Attributions of familiarity in amnesia: Evidence from a fame
judgment task. Neuropsychology, 7, 510-518.
To evaluate the extent to which amnesic patients can attribute
the source of familiarity to its correct source during a fame judgment
task, gains in familiarity were placed in opposition to conscious
recollection. In the 1st experiment, patients and controls were told
specifically that nonfamous names presented just prior to a fame judgment
task were not famous; in the 2nd experiment they were told that nonfamous
names were in fact famous. Although such instructions produced
dramatically different results in the fame judgment performance of normal
control Ss, minimal change in attribution of fame occurred for the amnesic
Ss. It is concluded that the amnesic Ss were unable to attribute the
familiarity of a previously presented name to its correct source because
of their inability to recollect a name's prior presentation. Hence, it
may be the nature of the memory query rather than the adequacy of a
specific memory system that determines whether or not an amnesic patient
can access information in memory.
Dywan, J., Segalowitz, S.J., Henderson, D., & Jacoby, L.L.
(1993). Memory for source after traumatic brain injury. Brain &
Cognition, 21, 20-43.
Used a fame judgment task to distinguish Ss' ability to
recognize previously presented information from their ability to
recognize the source of that information. 13 traumatic brain injured
(TBI) Ss (aged 18-42 yrs) were impaired relative to controls with respect
to verbal recognition as well as memory for source. However, memory for
source was independent of explicit indices of recall and recognition
ability. It was also an extremely sensitive index of coma duration in the
TBI Ss. The anticipated relationship between source memory and a putative
index of frontal function (Wisconsin Card Sorting Test) was modest
relative to the relationship between source memory and Ss' performance on
a complex visual pattern matching task (Benton Facial Recognition),
raising questions about hypothesized cognitive and neurophysiological
mechanisms underlying memory for source.
Jacoby, L.L., Ste-Marie, D., & Toth, J.P. (1993). Redefining
automaticity: Unconscious influences, awareness and control. In A.D.
Baddeley & L. Weiskrantz (Eds.), Attention, selection, awareness
and control. A tribute to Donald Broadbent (pp.261-282). London:
Oxford University Press.
Chapter: argue that . . . automaticity is not a characteristic
of processing controlled by stimuli, but rather is an emergent property
of the exercise of specific skills in an environment / that is,
automaticity is not driven by stimuli separately from skills that are
brought into play by intentions / [attempt] to redefine automaticity
(unconscious influences) in terms of a measure of intentional,
consciously-controlled [thought and behavior] / [argue] that awareness is
a prerequisite for conscious control, and then describe the
methodological advantages of arranging a situation such that consciously-controlled
processing acts in opposition to unconscious processes / describe a
'process-dissociation procedure' and show how it can be used to derive
separate quantitative estimates of the effects of consciously-controlled
and unconscious processes / describe a series of experiments that used a
flanker paradigm to investigate spatial selection and automatic
influences of memory.
Jacoby, L.L., Toth, J.P., & Yonelinas, A.P. (1993).
Separating conscious and unconscious influences of memory: Measuring
recollection. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 122,
139-154.
How can conscious and unconscious influences of memory be
measured? In this article, a process-dissociation procedure (L. L. Jacoby,
1991) was used to separate automatic (unconscious) and consciously
controlled influences within a task. For recall cued with word stems,
automatic influences of memory (1) remained invariant across
manipulations of attention that substantially reduced conscious
recollection and (2) were highly dependent on perceptual similarity from
study to test. Comparisons with results obtained through an indirect test
show the advantages of the process-dissociation procedure as a means of
measuring unconscious influences. The measure of recollection derived
from this procedure is superior to measures gained from classic test
theory and signal-detection theory. The process-dissociation procedure
combines assumptions from these 2 traditional approaches to measuring
memory.
Ste-Marie, D.M., & Jacoby, L.L. (1993). Spontaneous vs
directed recognition: The relativity of automaticity. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory & Cognition, 19,
777-788.
Examined the contrast between spontaneous and directed recognition
by using the flanker paradigm. It was reasoned that spontaneous
recognition of a flanking word would be reflected by the influence that
word had on recognition of a target word. In a first experiment, when
attention was divided at test, recognition decisions were made more
rapidly when flanker and target words were congruent, rather than
incongruent, with regard to the response they dictated. In later
experiments, the authors attempted to specify factors that influence
spontaneous recognition of a flanking word and examined the effects of
number of prior presentations and physical similarity between study and
test. To anticipate, the nature of the results leads to questioning
whether recognition is ever truly spontaneous. The findings are discussed
in relation to the relativity of automaticity.
Cermak, L.S., Verfaellie, M., Sweeney, M., & Jacoby, L.L.
(1992). Fluency versus conscious recollection in the word-completion
performance of amnesic patients. Brain & Cognition, 20,
367-377.
Conducted 2 experiments with 19 amnesic male patients and 17
alcoholics as controls. In the Exp 1 task, Ss were told not to utilize
previously presented words during stem completion (an Exclusion
condition) or to complete the stem with the first word that came to mind
(an Inclusion condition). The amnesics' performance, unlike that of the
alcoholics, did not significantly differ as a function of task condition.
Exp 2 examined whether amnesics' conscious recollection could be enhanced
by presenting the study list 5 times. The amnesics now were able to
exclude a significant number of items from the study list, but less
frequently than alcoholics. Findings suggest that for alcoholics, word
completion performance is likely mediated by a combination of fluency and
recollection, while for amnesics, performance is almost exclusively based
on fluency with which an item comes to mind.
Jacoby, L.L., & Kelley, C.M. (1992). A process-dissociation
framework for investigating unconscious influences: Freudian slips,
projective tests, subliminal perception and signal detection theory. Current
Directions in Psychological Science, 1(6), 174-179.
Demonstrates that unconscious influences can be treated in a
framework that resembles signal detection theory. The method developed
separates the contributions of unconscious and consciously controlled
influences within a single task, just as signal detection theory
separates the contributions of different processes to performance of a
single task. The process-dissociation (PD) approach assumes that given a
measure of conscious control, one can estimate unconscious influences
within the confines of the same task. The stem-completion task provides
an illustration. The PD procedure is a valuable tool to separate
conscious and unconscious processes in domains where conscious processes
contaminate unconscious measures, and it may prove equally valuable in
assessing the role of unconscious, or automatic, processes in tasks that
are mistakenly regarded as pure measures of conscious memory or
perception.
Jacoby, L.L., Levy, B.A., & Steinbach, K. (1992). Episodic
transfer and automaticity: Integration of data-driven and
conceptually-driven processing in rereading. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 18, 15-24.
Proposes that data-driven and conceptually driven processing
become integrated to form an episodic representation that mediates
transfer to later reading and memory tasks. These experiments explored
conditions that produce visual script specificity for episodic transfer.
Earlier work suggested that script sensitivity is reliably found only
when the script is unusual or difficult to read, leading some researchers
to suggest that such transfer occurs only during unskilled reading. These
studies, however, demonstrate reliable script sensitivity in an easy,
semantically based reading task using normal scripts. Transfer to the 2nd
occurrence is harmed by a change in script when the S's task is to
silently read and answer short questions. No such script sensitivity is
observed when the task is to read the questions aloud on each occurrence.
The data are discussed in terms of automatic processing when reading is
backgrounded in the service of a semantic task.
Jacoby, L.L., Lindsay, D.S., & Toth, J.P. (1992).
Unconscious processes revealed: Attention, awareness, and control. American
Psychologist, 47(6), 802-809.
Recent findings of dissociations between direct and indirect
tests of memory and perception have renewed enthusiasm for the study of
unconscious processing. The authors argue that such findings are heir to
the same problems of interpretation as are earlier evidence of
unconscious influences, namely, one cannot eliminate the possibility that
conscious processes contaminated the measure of unconscious processes. To
solve this problem, the authors define unconscious influences in terms of
lack of conscious control and then describe a process dissociation
procedure that yields separate quantitative estimates of the concurrent
contributions of unconscious and consciously controlled processing to
task performance. This technique allows one to go beyond demonstrating
the existence of unconscious processes to examine factors that determine
their magnitude.
Jacoby, L.L., Toth, J.P., Lindsay, D.S., & Debner, J.A.
(1992). Lectures for a layperson: Methods for revealing unconscious
processes. In R. Bornstein & T. Pittman (Eds.), Perception without
awareness (pp.81-120). NY: Guilford Press.
Chapter: [discusses] the importance of subjective experience /
present evidence to show that subjective experience is constructed and
reflects an unconscious inference or attribution process / argue that
awareness is a prerequisite for conscious control and that an important
function of conscious control is to oppose unconscious influences /
describe the methodological advantages of arranging a situation such that
consciously controlled and unconscious processes act in opposition to one
another /// describe the process dissociation procedure and show how it
can be used to derive separate quantitative estimates of consciously
controlled and unconscious processes / discuss the advantages of
separating the contributions of conscious and unconscious processes
within a task as compared to focusing on dissociations between tasks and
identifying tasks with particular types of processes / [conclude] by
identifying unconscious influences with automaticity and by emphasizing
parallels between unconscious perception and effects produced by dividing
attention.
Toth, J.P., Lindsay, D.S., & Jacoby, L.L. (1992). Awareness,
automaticity, and memory dissociations. In L.R. Squire & N. Butters
(Eds.), Neuropsychology of memory (2nd Ed., pp.46-57). NY:
Guilford.
Chapter: argue that the linkage among kind of test, kind of
subjective experience, and kind of underlying memory process is not so
fixed / drawing a parallel between memory and attention, we argue that
performance on any memory test is a joint product of controlled and
automatic uses of memory, and propose that the subjective experience that
accompanies task performance (e.g., remembering) is the product of an
interpretive process by which current mental events are attributed to
specific sources (e.g., memory) on the basis of evidence / describe a
"process dissociation procedure" that allows one to separate
the contributions of different processes to performance on a given task.
Jacoby, L.L. (1991). A process dissociation framework:
Separating automatic from intentional uses of memory. Journal
of Memory and Language, 30, 513-541.
Conducted 3 experiments with 116 students to separate
intentional from automatic influence of memory. Exps 1 and 2 illustrate
problems of interpreting task dissociations (DSs) and demonstrate the
advantages of interference (INT) paradigms (e.g., proactive INT) over
facilitation (FC) paradigms (e.g., transfer effects in word fragment
completion) as a means to investigate automaticity. Exp 3 illustrates the
use of process DS framework, combining data from an FC paradigm with
those from an INT paradigm so as to separate the contributions of
automatic and intentional processing. Evidence is provided in favor of a
2-factor theory of recognition memory in which 1 factor relies on
automatic processes and the other relies on intentional processes.
Jacoby, L.L., & Kelley, C.M. (1991). Unconscious influences of
memory: Dissociations and automaticity. In D. Milner & M. Rugg
(Eds.), The neuropsychology of consciousness (pp.201-233). London,
UK: Academic Press.
Chapter: goal . . . is to provide an overview of our research on
unconscious influences of memory / describe several experiments, and
concentrate on the procedures used in those experiments as well as the
results that they produced /// begin by discussing the importance of
subjective experience and by suggesting that the subjective experience of
remembering is not identical to use of a corresponding memory trace ///
argue that consciously controlled processing does sometimes direct
behaviour, and show that advantages can be gained by arranging a
situation such that consciously controlled and automatic influences of
memory act in opposition to one another /// misattributions of memory /
illusions of memory / separating automatic from consciously controlled
bases for judgements: the process dissociation procedure / differential
effects of dividing attention during study / parallels between accounts
of dissociation and theories of automaticity.
Allen, S.W., & Jacoby, L.L. (1990). Reinstating study
context produces unconscious influences of memory. Memory and
Cognition, 18, 270-278.
Chapter: goal . . . is to provide an overview of our research on
unconscious influences of memory / describe several experiments, and
concentrate on the procedures used in those experiments as well as the
results that they produced /// begin by discussing the importance of
subjective experience and by suggesting that the subjective experience of
remembering is not identical to use of a corresponding memory trace ///
argue that consciously controlled processing does sometimes direct
behaviour, and show that advantages can be gained by arranging a
situation such that consciously controlled and automatic influences of
memory act in opposition to one another /// misattributions of memory /
illusions of memory / separating automatic from consciously controlled
bases for judgements: the process dissociation procedure / differential
effects of dividing attention during study / parallels between accounts
of dissociation and theories of automaticity.
Jacoby, L.L., & Hollingshead, A. (1990). Toward a generate/recognize
model of performance on direct and indirect tests of memory. Journal
of Memory, and Language, 29, 433-454.
Two experiments compared 120 undergraduates' performances on
memory tests. Word stems were presented to be completed as an indirect
test of memory. For a direct test of memory, the same stems were
presented as cues for recall of earlier-presented words. Ss in a
generate/recognize test condition generated a completion for each word
stem and then judged whether the generated word was presented earlier.
Interactions of test conditions with a prior processing and a materials
variable were successfully predicted by a generate/recognize model of
recall that postulates 2 bases for memory decisions. Cued-recall differed
from stem-completion performance in that recognition processes were
involved in the former but not the latter task.
Jacoby, L.L., & Hollingshead, A. (1990). Reading student
essays may be hazardous to your spelling: Effects of reading incorrectly
and correctly spelled words. Canadian Journal of Psychology, 44(3),
345-358.
Examined the effects on spelling of reading and of reproducing
correctly and incorrectly spelled words in 2 experiments involving 108
undergraduate students. Reading correctly and incorrectly spelled words
influenced later spelling accuracy for those same words. Reproducing the
spelling of words did not have any effects on later spelling accuracy
beyond those produced by reading the words. However, reproducing a
correctly spelled word did speed the production of a later correct
spelling for the word, whereas reading did not speed later production.
Effects on spelling accuracy were dissociated from recognition memory for
previously presented words.
Jacoby, L.L., & Kelley, C.M. (1990). An episodic view of
motivation: Unconscious influences of memory. In E.T. Higgins & R.M.
Sorrentino (Eds.), Handbook of motivation and cognition (Vol.2,
pp.451-481). NY: Guilford Press.
Chapter: behavior is often guided by unconscious influences of
memory for prior episodes / interested in unconscious influences that
originate from a myriad of mundane experiences / by "unconscious
influences of memory," we refer to effects of prior experience on
the performance of some task that arise even though a person does not
consciously remember the relevant prior experience /// consider it likely
that the unconscious influences of prior episodes that we find so
prevalent in perception, problem solving, and judgment also play an
important role in motivated behavior / what an episodic view means for
predicting the effects of motivational variables and other social factors
is that effects are more controlled by local circumstances than would be
expected if an abstract representation of knowledge, such as a schema,
were responsible for directing behavior /// to illustrate what we mean by
an episodic view of motivation, we briefly describe the different
functions with which motivation is credited, and the theories that have
emphasized those functions / for each function of motivation, we argue
that the interpretation of that function changes when one considers the
role of unconscious influences of prior episodes.
Jacoby, L.L., Marriott, M., & Collins, J. (1990). The
specifics of memory and cognition. In T.K. Srull & R.S. Wyer (Eds.), Advances
in social cognition, Volume III: Content and process specificity in the
effects of prior experiences (pp.111-121). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
chapter: our [the authors'] experiments have typically examined
effects on word and picture perception, but the issues are the same as for
social cognition /// although similar, there are some potentially
important differences between our view and that proposed by [Eliot R.]
Smith / provide comments on some of those differences along with a brief
description of our view /// consider differences in research strategies /
illustrate our research strategy by briefly describing a few lines of
research that have grown out of our episodic view of cognition: Discusses
the chapter by E. R. Smith (see 90-235027-001).
Kelley, C.M., & Jacoby, L.L. (1990). The construction of
subjective experience: Memory attributions. Mind and Language, 5(1),
49-68.
Chapter: consider the bases for the subjective experience of
remembering / in [the authors'] analysis of memory, the experience of
remembering also derives from inferences, but the cues that are the basis
for those inferences are aspects of one's own thoughts and behavior /
illustrate the importance of inference in the subjective experience of
remembering by showing errors of inference / show that illusions of
memory can be produced / discuss the importance of those illusions for
uncovering the bases for the subjective experience of remembering ///
consider intention with reference to both conscious and unconscious
influences of the past / argue that conscious intentions do sometimes
direct behaviour / describe an experimental method that we have found
useful for separating conscious from unconscious effects.
Whittlesea, B.W.A., & Jacoby, L.L. (1990). Interaction of
prime repetition with visual degradation: Is priming a retrieval
phenomenon? Journal of Memory and Language, 29, 546-565.
Pronunciation of a word can be facilitated by preceding its
presentation with that of an associatively related word. This associative
priming effect has been interpreted as produced by activation spreading
through a network. In such models, processing of the prime cannot be made
conditional on unforeseen events. In 4 experiments with 25 undergraduates
each, the degradation and relatedness of a word following the prime was
manipulated, and the effects on the time taken to pronounce a repetition
of the prime were observed. Pronunciation of the repeated prime was
fastest when the second word was degraded and related to the prime.
Results are interpreted to mean that degradation of the second word
caused unitization of that word with its prime; such qualitative shifts
may be best understood in terms of changes in retrieval processing.
Whittlesea, B.W.A., Jacoby, L.L., & Girard, K.A. (1990).
Illusions of immediate memory: Evidence of an attributional basis for
feelings of familiarity and perceptual quality. Journal of Memory and
Language, 29, 716-732.
Produced illusions of immediate memory and of perception by
manipulating item characteristics for a recognition test to demonstrate
that subjective experience of familiarity and perceptual quality may rely
on an unconscious attribution process. 164 undergraduates saw a short and
rapidly presented list of words and then pronounced and judged a target
word. Judgments of repetition were influenced by clarity (Exps 1 and 2),
but not when Ss knew that clarity was manipulated (Exp 3). Conversely,
judgments of clarity were influenced by repetition (Exp 4). Fluent
performance is unconsciously attributed to whatever source is apparent,
and feelings of familiarity and perceptual quality result when fluency is
attributed respectively to past experience or current circumstances.
Jacoby, L.L., & Dallas, M.
(1981). On the relationship between autobiographical memory and
perceptual learning. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General, 3, 306-340.
Reports experiments designed to
explore the relationship between the more aware autobiographical form of
memory that is measured by a recognition memory test and the less aware
form of memory that is expressed in perceptual learning. Ss were 247
undergraduates. Variables such as the level of processing of words during
study influenced recognition memory, but not subsequent perceptual
recognition. In contrast, variables such as the number and the spacing of
repetitions produced parallel effects on perceptual recognition and
recognition memory. It is suggested that there are 2 bases for
recognition memory. If an item is readily perceived so that it seems to
"jump out" from the page, the S is likely to judge that it has
been seen in the experimental situation. The 2nd basis for recognition
memory involves elaboration of a word's study context and depends on such
factors as level of processing during study--factors not important for
perceptual recognition of isolated words. Effects of study on perceptual
recognition appear to be totally due to memory for physical or graphemic
information. Results are also relevant to theories of perceptual
learning. Effects of study on perceptual recognition partly depend on the
same variables as do effects on more standard memory tests.
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